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INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY IN CORPORATE LAW
ELISABETH DE FONTENAY*
The field of corporate law is riven with competing visions of the corpora-
tion. This Article seeks to identify points of broad agreement by negative impli-
cation. It examines two developments in corporate law that have drawn
widespread criticism from corporate law scholars: the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of corporate religious rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Nevada
legislature's decision to eliminate mandatory fiduciary duties for corporate di-
rectors and officers. Despite their fundamental differences, both resulted in ex-
panding individual rights or autonomy within the corporation-for shareholders
and managers, respectively.
The visceral critiques aimed at these two developments suggest a broadly
shared view that the corporation is a device that should be optimized for collec-
tive action of a particular type-namely large-scale economic activity. As such,
once one has opted into the corporate form, little room remains for the exercise
of individual rights and autonomy ex post. Corporate law permits shareholders
and managers to act only in limited and highly formalized ways. In this view, the
strong assertion of shareholder and managerial autonomy in Hobby Lobby and
Nevada's corporate law is problematic fbr three reasons. First, it conflicts with
longstanding principles underlying the corporate form. Second, it is arguably
inefficient, even where it comports with the parties' private ordering. Third, de-
spite its liberalizing aims, it is likely to foster even greater regulatory complexity
or involvement in the long run.
While there are no easy answers to how one should weigh individual rights
against economic efficiency, advancing personal autonomy by altering the cor-
porate form may ultimately provide little autonomy bang for one's buck. From
both a rights and an efficiency perspective, there are better means to champion
the individual over the group.
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INTRODUCTION
What is a corporation? The question is surprisingly difficult to answer.
In the United States, the technical, albeit tautological, answer is that it is an
entity recognized by state law as a "corporation." So long as one follows to
the letter the steps for incorporation prescribed by a state's corporate stat-
ute-such as filing a charter with the secretary of state and designating a
registered agent for service of process-the end product is a corporation. A
more satisfactory answer might point to the corporation's particular govern-
ance structure. Generalizing across state corporate statutes, a corporation
might be described as a legal entity that is managed by a board of directors,
which in turn is elected by "stockholders"-individuals or entities having a
residual claim on the entity's profits. This definition is also problematic,
however, in that corporate statutes also routinely allow for corporations that
do not issue stock, while some allow for shareholder-managed corporations.
A third approach would be to consider the uses to which corporations tend to
be put. The permitted uses of corporations are virtually unrestricted under
state law today. The typical uses of corporations are bifurcated: corporations
that issue stock tend to conduct business for profit, sometimes on a very
large scale, while nonstock corporations tend to engage in charitable, educa-
tional, religious, or other non-profit activities. Yet the lines of demarcation
are far from clear.
A final approach would refer to the various theories for why one might
conduct business through a corporate entity, rather than directly in the mar-
ket. Transaction costs,' asset specificity, 2 asset partitioning,' and incomplete
contracting,4 among others, have all been offered as justifications for the
corporation. Yet these "theories of the firm" fail to distinguish corporations
from other business entities: they explain not only corporations, but also
'See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 390-93 (1937).
2 See OUvER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 20-40 (1975).
3 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000); Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law
and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2006).
4 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
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unincorporated business entities such as partnerships and limited liability
companies.
The ontological task of defining the corporation is particularly chal-
lenging today, when the state has largely ceded to private parties the task of
establishing rights and duties among the corporation and its various stake-
holders. Under this "contractarian" approach, the primary function of corpo-
rate statutes and the common law of corporations is not regulation, but rather
helping parties set their own terms for the corporate endeavor.5 As a result,
today's corporation is a protean vehicle, able to accommodate a wide range
of activities and on a wide scale.
Given its many competing visions, it is perhaps easier to clarify what
the corporation is by finding agreement over what the corporation is not.6
This Article seeks to do precisely that. It explores two relatively recent de-
velopments in corporate law that have mostly been greeted with criticism by
corporate law scholars. The first is the Supreme Court's recognition of cor-
porate religious rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.' The second is
the Nevada legislature's decision to eliminate management's mandatory fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation. To be sure, both developments are perhaps
best viewed as anomalous within corporate law and likely narrow in applica-
tion. Yet just as the "anti-canon" in U.S. constitutional law reveals broad
zones of agreement in an otherwise contentious field,' so do these much-
criticized developments in corporate law help identify shared understandings
of the corporate form today.
By most counts, these two developments are entirely unrelated: they
differ as to the decision-maker (the judiciary versus the legislature), the
source of authority (federal versus state law), the subject matter, and the area
of law. Accordingly, they have thus far been criticized on entirely different
grounds. Nonetheless, there is a common thread between them. Both can be
interpreted at least in part as efforts to expand individual rights or autonomy
'See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305, 311 (1976) (defining the firm
as a "nexus for contracting relationships").
6 For the more difficult exercise of building a consensus view of the corporation and cor-
porate law from the bottom up, see William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate
Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723 (identifying the purpose of corporate law as "facilitat[ing]
corporate attempts to maximize productive output . . ., encouraging long-term investment at
the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control externalities").
1 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). As of the writing of this Article, the Supreme Court's decision is
anticipated in a related case, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App.
2015) (determining whether corporations have a constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion, in the context of a bakery's objection to a Colorado antidiscrimination law requiring it
to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). Hobby Lobby was decided under a 1993
federal statute prohibiting government from burdening a person's exercise of religion, while
Masterpiece addresses a constitutional claim under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause.
'See generally Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.
J. 243 (1998).
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of a particular corporate constituency-shareholders in the case of Hobby
Lobby, and management in the case of Nevada corporate law. Both reflect
the political or philosophical stance that, even within a vehicle designed to
constrain individual behavior ex ante, a particular space should be preserved
for individual rights and autonomy ex post.
Yet the strong criticisms of Hobby Lobby and Nevada's corporate law
suggest a majority or plurality view among corporate law scholars that indi-
vidual rights and autonomy should not be expanded indefinitely within the
corporation, even when the relevant parties contract to that effect or simply
fail to specify otherwise. In particular, these criticisms seem to reveal im-
plicit agreement on several points: that the corporation is first and foremost a
device optimized for collective action of a particular type, namely large-
scale economic activity; that the corporation is a relatively poor vehicle for
exercising individual rights of expression or individual autonomy; and, fi-
nally, that corporate law should restrict individual rights and autonomy ex
post, when the latter threatens the ex ante efficiency of collective action.
This is so for several reasons. First, expanding individual autonomy may
conflict with other longstanding principles and goals underlying the corpo-
rate form. Second, doing so may well be inefficient, regardless of whether
the parties may be deemed to have bargained for that outcome. The cost-
benefit balancing for both the Hobby Lobby decision and Nevada's corporate
law is either speculative or likely unfavorable. Third, though clearly liberal-
izing in aim, both developments are likely to have the opposite effect in
practice, whether by increasing regulatory complexity or by requiring
greater regulatory involvement over time.
This Article does not offer a historical review of theories of the corpo-
ration. Nor is it intended as a critique of the contractarian approach to corpo-
rate law. Rather, it looks to corporate law scholarship today to ask whether
we have reached the point where further deference to private ordering and
further alterations to the corporate form for the sake of individual autonomy
would be at odds with economic efficiency. The failure in Hobby Lobby and
Nevada's fiduciary duty debate to address efficiency considerations head-on
is surprising in an area of law where they typically loom large today. More
surprising still, these two changes to corporate law appear likely to result in
a regulatory morass that ultimately increases individual autonomy relatively
little.
As a general matter, of course, the charge that expanding individual
rights can be economically inefficient may be very much beside the point.
The claim here is simply that altering corporate law is a comparatively poor
mechanism for the expression of individual rights. Thus, to the extent that
efficiency considerations should figure in legislative and judicial decisions
to expand individual autonomy-a question that is not answered here-we
might concede in the case of corporate religious rights and the elimination of
corporate fiduciary duties that any individual autonomy gained is small rela-
tive to the likely economic cost.
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Finally, the Article defends the use of distinct entity types or forms in
business organizational law and even within corporate law. There is nothing
inherently unjust or inefficient about limiting any given business entity to
certain purposes or certain users. For example, restricting the rights and
goals of profit-seeking corporations to those relating to economic activity is
not necessarily arbitrary, antiquated, or government overreach. Corporate
law cannot be, and should not seek to be, everything to everyone.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the use of forms in
business organizational law, focusing particularly on the corporate form.
Part II discusses the efficiency considerations underlying the use of forms
and assesses how corporate law manages the tensions between individual
incentives and group decision-making. Parts III and IV apply these lessons
to two recent examples in which corporate law has been altered to expand
individual rights or autonomy: (1) the recognition of a for-profit corpora-
tion's right to exercise religion and (2) the elimination of management fidu-
ciary duties in corporate law.
I. DEFINING THE CORPORATE FORM
A. Lingering Questions in Corporate Law
In a 2001 essay, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman famously de-
clared "the end of history" for corporate law, pointing to convergence
worldwide on the view that corporations should be managed to maximize
long-term shareholder value.9 While dominant in the United States, this view
of corporate governance is not unanimously held. Proponents of "stake-
holder theory" argue that corporations should be managed to maximize the
aggregate value allocable to all corporate stakeholders-including creditors,
employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and even society as a
whole.' 0 The recent introduction in most U.S. states of a new type of busi-
ness entity, the "benefit corporation"-which requires management to take
into account the interests of all stakeholders, rather than just shareholders-
suggests that popular opinion does not necessarily share the business and
legal establishment's support for shareholder-value maximization."
Even if one accepts shareholder value maximization as the primary aim
of corporate governance, however, the work of corporate law is not finished.
In particular, it does not clearly dictate the extent to which corporate law
should defer to the private arrangements of corporate stakeholders. While
9Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
10 See generally EDWARD R. FREEMAN. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER AP-
PROACH (1984).
" See J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State
Statutes (January 15, 2015), available at https://ssm.com/abstract= 1988556 (finding that thirty
U.S. states have enacted statutes recognizing some form of public benefit corporation).
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the shareholder value approach tends to be associated with contractarian
views of the corporation, the former does not require total deference to pri-
vate bargaining.1 2 In particular, if there is reason to believe that private or-
dering might exacerbate management agency costs, opportunism, and other
inefficiencies that detract from shareholder value maximization, then there is
room for a more regulatory approach to corporate law.
This Article considers two areas in which the lingering uncertainties
associated with contractarianism lead to pressing problems for corporate law
and examines how corporate law scholars have responded. First, it considers
the question of what rights society should grant to the corporation itself. In
deciding whether or not to grant corporations a particular right that has al-
ready been granted to individuals, the courts have resorted to different theo-
ries of the corporation, on a seemingly ad hoc basis.' 3 In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a closely held corporation
could exercise religion and on the basis thereof avoid being subject to laws
of general applicability. 14 If shareholders wish for a corporation to exercise
religion by looking through to the religious views of individual shareholders,
should the courts honor this bargain and allow it to alter the corporation's
rights and duties to third parties under the law?
Second, the Article considers modifications to the traditional corporate
governance arrangement between shareholders and management. Nevada's
corporate law eliminates mandatory fiduciary duties of directors and officers
to the corporation and requires shareholders to contract affirmatively for
such fiduciary duties should they want them. If shareholders waive or simply
fail to contract for management fiduciary duties, should the law defer to this
arrangement or instead impose such duties by fiat?
As I will argue, both Hobby Lobby and the change to Nevada's corpo-
rate statute represent alterations to the traditional corporate form. In order to
see this, it is first helpful to examine the use of forms in business organiza-
tional law generally and to identify what makes the corporate form distinc-
tive. We turn to this task in the next section.
B. Forms in Business Organizational Law; The Corporate Form
Over time, the law of business organizations in the United States has
evolved from a prohibitive regime to a largely facilitative one. State law
provides a menu of different entity types that entrepreneurs can select to
" Nor does the principle of shareholder wealth maximization specify what should be
treated as a bargained-for outcome in the first place.
" See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 908 (2011) (describing the corporate
rights jurisprudence as shifting between three theories of the corporation-as real entity, as
legal entity, and as association). See also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014) (arguing that in corporate rights cases involving
constitutional law, the question is one of standing, rather than corporate personhood).
14 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-69 (2014).
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conduct their business.15 These statutory forms-each typically governed by
its own statute-include the corporation, unincorporated entities such as
limited liability companies, general partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability partnerships, as well as a hodge-podge of other entities such
as business trusts. Each form can be understood as a set of terms governing
the relationship among investors, managers, and the business entity itself.
Furthermore, many or most of the terms within each form are default terms,
meaning that they may be modified by the relevant parties if they so
choose.16 The terms supplied by the statute will apply only if the parties do
not modify them."
In setting the default terms, the implicit statutory objective is to divine
the terms that users of the form would be most likely to select if they were to
spend the time and money required to negotiate them.'" The hope is thus that
the default terms will represent the optimal set of terms (the "efficient"
terms) for a large portion of the market. As we will see, by anticipating the
needs of investors and managers in this way, organizational law facilitates
business enterprise and encourages investment by dramatically reducing the
transaction costs (including negotiation costs and information costs) of form-
ing, operating, and governing business entities, while at the same time af-
fording the parties considerable freedom to set their own terms."
This default-based approach is rightly touted as a defining feature of
contemporary organizational law. 20 Yet it obscures the fact that each form
also imposes, and is characterized by, a smaller set of mandatory terms-
those that cannot be modified by the parties under any circumstances21-and
of "sticky" default terms-those that are highly unlikely to be modified,
given procedural or other practical hurdles. 22 In corporate law, for example,
directors' and officers' fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation is a
mandatory term in most states, while the board of directors' exclusive au-
" See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1417 (1989) (describing the choices offered to management in forming a new
business entity).
" See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674-75 (2005) (noting that
Delaware corporate law includes very few mandatory terms and that some mandatory terms
may even be overridden under certain circumstances).
7 Id.
" See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 1444-45.
'
9 See infra Part II.A.
20 See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1391, 1416 (1992).
2 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1618 (describing U.S. corporate law as "partly
enabling, partly mandatory").
22 See Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Analysis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279 (2009) (finding that certain default rules in corpo-
rate law are highly unlikely to be modified by the parties, particularly those that favor manage-
ment over investors).
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thority to manage the corporation's affairs is considered a sticky default.23
Because they may not be, or are highly unlikely to be, modified, these
mandatory and sticky-default terms in fact represent the core, defining fea-
ture of each business entity form. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a non-
exhaustive sample of mandatory and sticky-default terms applicable to the
corporation under Delaware law.
In addition to state business-association statutes, contemporary organi-
zational law in the United States is substantially determined by the common
law. 2 4 Particularly in states such as Delaware, where the majority of large
U.S. firms are chartered, judges create much of the law of business organiza-
tions. This is particularly true for terms such as the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors and officers and for specific applications, such as control transactions
and takeover contests. 25 The legal doctrines established by the courts and
applicable fiduciary law can thus be understood as an additional set of
mandatory terms applicable to business associations.
Taken together, therefore, the state business-organization statutes and
the common law define and characterize the organizational forms available
for conducting business in the United States. Thus, the considerable flexibil-
ity of business organization in the U.S. is not unlimited. It is grounded in
several distinct forms, each having a core of fixed or relatively rigid terms
and rules, as well as a comprehensive set of default terms, that collectively
facilitate and shape the fundamental relationships of business entities.
Relative to other entity types, the corporate form is characterized by
five fundamental features that are the product of its mandatory or default
terms: (1) limited liability for investors, (2) continuity of existence, (3) free
transferability of equity interests, (4) centralized management, and (5) the
election of management by equity investors. 26 Other entities share some-
but not all-of these characteristics. In most cases the terms of the limited
liability company may be modified in such a way as to replicate each of
these characteristics. 27 However, there are transaction costs in using a limited
liability company to replicate the archetypal corporation, because one must
draft around the default terms, and investors must take the time and make
23 See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU
L. REv. 383, 414-15, 427-28 (2007).
24 See Leo E. Strine Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawfid, Presumably There Are Circum-
stances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of
Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAW. 877, 878-79 (2005) (discussing the important role of the
common law in Delaware corporate law and providing examples of important corporate law
questions that have been answered by the common law).
25 See id. at 878-79, 884-86 (discussing the role of the common law in defining manage-
ment fiduciary duties).
26 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 4-24 (1986).
27 See Saul Levmore, Uncorporations and the Delaware Strategy, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv.
195, 199 (2005) (claiming that "[a]nything a corporation can do, a partnership can do
better.").
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the effort to become comfortable with the drafting." In addition, the com-
mon law of corporations and the common law of limited liability companies
continue to differ, and there is no guarantee that a court would treat the
parties' arrangement as equivalent to a corporation. 29 Thus, only the corpora-
tion presents each of the five above-listed features as either mandatory or
default options. Of these, the governance mechanism of the corporation-
the use of a board of directors elected by the shareholders to manage the
corporation-is the most unique feature of the corporation. It is the sticky
default term that truly defines the corporate form.30
To complicate matters, as will be discussed in Part IV, in a very real
sense the set of forms available for conducting business is not limited to the
discrete legal entity types defined by state statutes. The "corporation," for
instance, may be viewed as a compendium of different forms of organiza-
tion, rather than as a single form. While these different forms comprise
many overlapping terms and judicial doctrine, each has a core of distinct
terms, supplied both by statute and by the common law. The clearest exam-
ples are (1) the for-profit corporation and (2) the nonprofit, nonstock corpo-
ration, both of which are typically governed by the same state corporate
statute. 3 1 (Nonprofit entities are often also governed by a separate state stat-
ute.)3 2 The remainder of this Article focuses on the for-profit corporation.
The explanation for this multiplicity of forms within a single organiza-
tional statute has to do, once again, with the facilitative approach taken by
modern business organizational law. That approach remains highly agnostic,
as to the uses to which its forms are put and, in many cases, to the key
features of governance selected by the relevant parties. Once a particular use
is selected and evidenced by the organization's activities, or a particular gov-,
ernance structure is elected, however, the elected form may impose addi-
tional restrictions and structure.33
28 See Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?,
42 J. CORP. L. 503, 505 (2017) (discussing the flexibility provided through the LLC form and
noting that "[b]ecause traditional corporate protections impose costs on the firm and its own-
ers, waiving them can be desirable when parties adequately protect themselves through other,
more efficient means").
29 See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U.
PA. L. REv. 1609, 1621-23 (2004) (noting that it is unsettled whether disputes that arise in the
LLC context should be answered with reference to corporate law, agency law, or contract law,
or in some other fashion).
30 See Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of
the New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 Dat. J. CORP. L. 139, 149 (2009).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-115 (2018).
32 See, e.g., N.Y. NOr-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 101-1515 (McKinney 2017).
13 See infra Part IV.
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II. EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF FORMS
A. To Form or Not To Form
The considerable flexibility afforded by each business organizational
form raises the question of why forms are needed at all. Why go to the
trouble of defining particular entity types such as the corporation, the limited
liability company, and so forth, when so many of their terms are defaults that
may be modified by the parties? Conversely, if forms are indeed useful legal
innovations, why not multiply them ad infinitum, creating a different form
for each arrangement that any party or set of parties could conceivably
adopt, rather than steering parties to a limited set of forms? Finally, under
what circumstances should the terms of a particular form be changed by law,
as opposed to simply creating a new form? This subpart briefly addresses
each of these questions, from the sole standpoint of efficiency considera-
tions. (As we shall see, however, cost-benefit analysis is by no means the
sole or even the primary explanation for where current law rests).
The most significant development in the history of organizational law
in the United States was acceptance of the "legal fiction" that gave entities
independent legal significance from their members.3 4 Dating back several
centuries, the general partnership was the earliest recognized form of busi-
ness association.35 The general partnership was initially viewed as the simple
aggregate of its partners, without independent legal significance, but over
time was increasingly treated as a legal object distinct from its partners, with
the right to own assets, to enter into contracts, and to sue and be sued.36 The
path of organizational law has since followed a pattern of increasing the
number of legal entities available for conducting business. For centuries, the
progress was halting, with the only available options being the general part-
nership, the trust, the corporation (which appeared in its modern incarnation
in the 18th century), and the limited partnership (from the mid-19th cen-
tury).37 In the last four decades alone, however, there has been a burst of new
entity creation, including the limited liability company, the limited liability
3 See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-From Nature to Func-
tion, 118 PENN Sr. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013) (noting that "separate legal personality and limited
liability are universally considered bedrock corporate law principles"); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000)
(describing how the doctrinal fiction of the business association as a separate legal entity
serves to facilitate capital lock-in).
" See Larry E. Ribstein, Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely
Held Firm, 33 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 531, 534 (2011).
3 The most recent revision to the Uniform Partnership Act, promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws in 1997, finally abandons the remain-
ing partnership law provisions relying on the conception of a partnership as an aggregate of its
partners rather than as an entity.
17 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 390; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraak-
man & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REv. 5, 6-7 (2005).
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partnership, the limited liability limited partnership, and the benefit corpora-
tion, among many others.38
Given this evolution, there is a case to be made that the use of definite
forms for conducting business is a simple matter of historical path-depen-
dence, rather than the product of a deliberate cost-benefit analysis. If that is
the case, why specify different entity types at all today, rather than allowing
private parties to create any entity of their choosing? The use of predeter-
mined forms is thought to be welfare-increasing because it can dramatically
lower the transaction costs associated with both forming a business entity
and regulating it.39 If contracting among entrepreneurs, investors, and man-
agers were costless, and all parties had perfect information, there would be
no advantage to selecting an existing entity form for their joint business
arrangement (although there might still be an advantage to using forms from
regulators' perspective).40 In the real world, however, negotiating the terms
of a joint business endeavor is a highly complex task, involving substantial
uncertainty about future developments and imperfect information about the,
various parties' incentives and behavior. 41 Given that, there should be sub-
stantial transaction costs associated with negotiating a business arrangement
entirely from scratch.
Contemporary organizational law thus offers a set of templates from
which to choose, with the goal of capturing or even anticipating in separate
forms the various popular modes of organizing businesses. For example, the
partnership form provides investors with the opportunity for equal manage-
ment rights whereas the corporate form offers passive investment opportuni-
ties. On this view, the default terms of each form should be those most likely:
to be adopted by the parties, if they were to actually go through the costly,
exercise of negotiating all of the terms. 42 Equivalently, the default terms are
intended to be the set of "efficient" terms-that is, the terms that maximize
the parties' aggregate social surplus-for the majority of the likely users of
the form.43 By simply forming a corporation, for example, the parties avoid
having to consider and negotiate every aspect of the investors' economic
rights and the governance and management of the business in advance. They
simply defer largely to the wisdom presumably embedded in the terms of the
" See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 37, at 6 (listing examples of the new
business forms that have emerged in the last four decades).
3 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 1421-22; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,
102 HARV. L. Rnv. 1820, 1827 (1989).
' But see, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 542 (1990) (arguing that business organization statutes are irrele-
vant because parties simply contract around default terms for whatever arrangement they
desire).
4" See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
42 See Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 1827 (noting that default terms should be those that
most parties would find to be value-maximizing).
43 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
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corporate form." If they find that certain terms happen to be ill-suited to
their particular arrangement, so long as such terms are mere defaults, they
can be modified by the parties by common agreement. 45
If the goal of the form is to anticipate the needs of most of its users, it
follows that there is some minimum number of forms that will maximize
aggregate social welfare. If too few forms are offered, the default terms of
each are less likely to be optimal for the vast majority of users. This, in turn,
will either constrain economic activity or force the parties to engage in
costly negotiations to drastically modify the form into which they were
ushered. The general partnership model is surely not optimal for all joint
business endeavors.
Why not then offer to the public as many different forms as there are
conceivable business arrangements? If forms are useful, why not offer one
thousand, rather than ten? Why not multiply the number of forms ad infin-
itum? The answer comes from returning to the original goal of offering
forms, which is to reduce the transaction costs associated with forming and
regulating businesses. Business forms, much like contract provisions, benefit
from certain network effects: the more users choose to adopt the form, the
more predictable the form becomes, and the more economically beneficial it
becomes.46 The Delaware corporation, for example, arguably benefits from
its predictability, given that it has long-standing case law and an established
bar familiar with the form.47 If the efficiency of forms is based on network
effects, there is some minimum threshold number of users of the form re-
quired for it to be efficient. 48 Increasing the number of users of a given form
will also increase economic -efficiencies.
Moreover, recall that forms serve an informational purpose: for less
experienced parties, forms have the advantage of steering parties toward the
arrangement that is most likely to be efficient for that type of business. 49 For
example, without knowing any organizational law, small business owners
are likely to choose an entity type such as the limited liability company for
their business, simply because they are aware that most similar businesses
' See generally Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (2006).
45 For example, Delaware corporate law allows for either the certificate of incorporation or
the by-laws to specify the quorum requirement for voting provided it is not less than one third.
However, the statute requires a majority for a quorum if the certificate of incorporation or by-
laws do not specify otherwise. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2007).
46 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 718-40 (1997) (dis-
cussing network effects from standardized contractual provisions); Michael Klausner, Corpo-
rations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995) (same).
47 See Klausner, supra note 46, 842-43, 846 (explaining the decision of an out-of-state
business to incorporate in the choice of Delaware in terms of network effects).
41 See id. at 793 ("The value of a contract term to a firm adopting it at a given time is an
increasing function of the number of firms that have adopted or that will adopt it.").
49 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 COR-
NELL L. REv. 608, 612 (1998) (arguing that individuals tend to assume that the default options
are better than the alternatives).
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do the same. A small number of forms also lowers the transaction costs of
regulation because problems that arise can be more easily identified and cor-
rected. For all of these reasons, there are likely to be considerable efficiency
benefits to using forms in business organizational law. Additionally, there is
some optimal number and set of forms that balances the competing consider-
ations of flexibility for business parties and network effects.
The optimal number of forms and the optimal set of terms offered in
each form is highly likely to change over time as economic, technological,
and institutional conditions change. Indeed, it is no surprise that the modern
stock corporation is intimately linked with the Industrial Revolution, in
which large amounts of capital were sought to develop new technologies
such as railroads. 0 How, then, should legislatures and the courts determine
when to update a form (by changing its mandatory or default terms, for
example) or to create new forms? A form should be altered or a new form
created when the existing form's terms are no longer efficient for the bulk of
users, or when there is a regulatory or public-policy reason for not permit-
ting the default term(s) that users would select."
In Parts III and IV, however, we will see that the Hobby Law decision
and the changes to Nevada's corporate law both alter traditional features of
the corporate form. From an efficiency perspective, such a move can only be
defended if the terms of the corporate form have become inefficient, requir-
ing that the form either be modified or subsumed into another existing form.
In fact, the recent changes do not appear to be prompted by efficiency con-
cerns. Rather, they seek to maximize individual rights or autonomy, even at
the expense of efficiency. As we shall see in Part II.B, however, a core goal
of corporate law is to coordinate or constrain individual behavior. For this
reason, it is a comparatively poor choice of regime in which to expand indi-
vidual rights.
B. Individual Versus Group Action in Corporate Law
How should we think about individual rights and autonomy in corpo-
rate law? The pursuit of economic self-interest, for example, already figures
prominently in the corporate framework: shareholders' individual profit mo-
tive can lead them to monitor management, to sell their shares when man-
agement performs poorly, and so forth, all of which aid in corporate
governance. Yet even such individual "economic" rights are not left unfet-
tered. Corporations are necessarily vehicles for collective action: by implica-
50 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 793
(2005).
" See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 183, 187-88 (2004)
(discussing the benefits provided by forms, including efficiency and "the development of in-
terpretive case law associated with distinct business associations rather than simply with indi-
vidual contract terms").
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tion, a primary function of corporate law is to coordinate and constrain
individual behavior-even profit-motivated behavior.52
Consider first the design of corporate law. From the time of Ronald
Coase, we have understood that firms exist precisely to avoid pure market
transactions.53 The costs associated with contracting on a one-off basis for
factors of production and financing are such that in many cases the most
efficient arrangement will be a collective endeavor in which governance and
agency replace individual spot contracting.5 4 This collective endeavor is re-
ferred to as a "firm."
As discussed, the for-profit corporate form imposes a very particular
form of governance-described as the separation of ownership and con-
trol-in which shareholders (who hold certain economic rights to residual
cash flows from the business) appoint a board of directors to manage the
business." This is so, because the corporation is a device that has been opti-
mized for collective action of a specific type, namely large-scale economic
activity. In contrast to the classic general partnership, for example, in which
each individual partner may be necessary to the firm's success, the corpora-
tion is intended to survive the departure of any individual shareholder, direc-
tor or officer. Crucially, then, the device of centralized management in the
corporation is used for the express purpose of coordinating and constraining
individual shareholder behavior and incentives.56 A centralized management
structure allows for decisions to be reached and actions to be taken even
when there is disagreement among shareholders, and it prevents opportunis-
tic individual shareholders from holding up the firm, withdrawing produc-
tive assets, or otherwise harming the firm's value.57 In most states, for
example, merging one corporation with another requires the vote of only a
simple majority of shareholders of each corporation. 8 Thus, corporations
52 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice
of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUm. L. REv. 1319, 1328-29 (1999) ("[S]upport for
insider trading regulation probably correlates positively with attitudes about the policing of
managerial self-dealing .... ); Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors' Fiduciary Duties: The
Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 675, 683 (2009) (noting that the Delaware Supreme
Court has long held that officers and directors are prohibited from exploiting their positions for
personal gains).
5 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 390-93 (1937).
54 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHiES: ANALYSIS AND ANTrIRUST
IMPLIcATIONS 20-40 (1975).
5 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-79 (1933).
16 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1657 (2001) ("[Elven in close
corporations or corporations with a controlling shareholder group, the limitations on share-
holders' ability to intervene, combined with the very small number of opportunities to vote
beyond voting on directors, protects the structure of centralized management by making it
impossible for shareholders qua shareholders to exercise the power of residual control over the
corporation's assets.").
" See id. (noting that centralized management also prevents shareholders from acting out
of self-interest).
5 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017).
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may merge over the objections of even a substantial minority of sharehold-
ers, which in turn prevents individual shareholders from seeking to hold up
value-increasing transactions in the hopes of extracting side payments.
Thus, corporate law serves to quash individual voices and actions by
design, in the interests of the group.59 Stated differently, shareholder voting
and board management serve as a mechanism for aggregating competing
individual interests-a mechanism that the parties can agree to ex ante, even
if there is some risk that they will not like the result ex post. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that corporate law sanctions individual action and voice only
in specific, highly formalized ways. Shareholders are called on to vote to
elect the board and on a handful of major corporate events-and they may
act self-interestedly in doing so-but otherwise do not generally participate
in the governance or operations of the corporation.
Contemporary corporate law constrains individual behavior by facilitat-
ing private ordering or through direct regulation. This premise provides a
framework for thinking about the effects of current moves to increase indi-
vidual rights and autonomy within the corporation. 60 The claim is that where
such individual rights or actions conflict with fundamental principles of the
underlying corporate form, or disrupt its mechanisms for channeling individ-
ual interests into firm behavior, the result will be little improvement in indi-
vidual autonomy and a large efficiency cost.
Thus, movements to increase individual rights or autonomy may prove
to be efficient or inefficient, and the history of corporate law bears this out.
In keeping with the principle of classical liberalism, for example, certain
increases in individual autonomy in corporate law have clearly proved
value-enhancing. In the 19th century, many states abandoned the practice of
requiring specific legislative acts for the chartering of corporations and in-
stead began to grant incorporations as a matter of right.6 1 This change
amounted to a clear expansion of individual freedom, as any would-be entre-
preneur could thenceforth make use of the corporate form. But this decision
was almost certainly economically efficient as well, by untethering eco-
nomic activity from the discretion of the state.62 On the other hand, certain
changes in corporate law that restricted individual autonomy within the cor-
poration have also yielded significant efficiency gains. The corporation's
right to own property in its own name and to enter into contracts are both
now viewed as necessary preconditions to large-scale business activity,63 yet
" See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempower-
ment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2006).
' For the comprehensive account of the clash between individual and group interests in
corporate law doctrine and prominent theories of the firm, see generally William W. Bratton,
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
6' See CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODIERN AMERI-
CAN CORPORATION LAW 33-53 (1993).
6 See Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate
Speech, 190 YALE L.J. 1833, 1845 (1981).
63 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 407-10.
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both effectively limit individual autonomy within the corporation. For exam-
ple, the first prevents individual shareholders from removing assets from the
business or from using such assets for personal purposes. The second pre-
vents individual shareholders from directing or preventing corporate actions.
To illustrate, Table 3 below summarizes the likely welfare effects of certain
developments in corporate law, according to whether they expanded or re-
stricted individual rights or autonomy.
TABLE 3. WELFARE EFFECTS OF SELECTED CHANGES TO INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY IN CORPORATE LAW.
Expansion of individual Restriction of individual
autonomy autonomy
(Probable) * Incorporation available * Corporation permitted to
increase in by right to all persons own property in its own
economic * Incorporation permitted name
welfare for any lawful purpose * Corporation permitted to
enter into contracts
* Shift from unanimous to
majority shareholder ap-
proval requirement for
mergers
(Probable) * Shareholders permitted * Staggered boards recog-
decrease in to exercise religious nized as permissible (thus
economic rights through the cor- enabling firms to prevent
welfare poration" shareholders from voting
* Elimination of all man- on the full board each
datory fiduciary duties year)('
of directors and offic-
65
ers
The point is simply that there are surely diminishing marginal returns to
expanding individual autonomy within a given area of law, and that the re-
cent changes in corporate law addressed herein may have moved us to the
64 See infra Part III.
65 See infra Part IV.
66 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. EcoN. 107,
115 (2003) (finding a negative association between staggered boards and firm value); Lucian
Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 783, 784-85
(2009) (same). But see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REv. 67 (2016) (critiquing the methodology of prior empiri-
cal studies of staggered boards).
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realm of negative returns.67 Of course, if one rejects utilitarianism, it is a
valid response to state that efficiency should be irrelevant when individual
rights are at issue. To the extent that society views efficiency outcomes as
material, however, as it generally appears to do in corporate law, legislators
and judges should be made aware of the calculus.
The push to maximize individual autonomy in corporate law may now
stand at cross-purposes with its purpose of coordinating and constraining
individual behavior in the most efficient manner. This clash of goals and
mechanism design has three implications, each illustrated in the applications
discussed in Parts III and IV below. First, in most cases the expansion of
individual autonomy is likely to be little more than nominal. Second, the
efficiency cost of accommodating such individual rights where they fit
poorly is likely to be material. Third, the resulting pressure on certain funda-
mental principles of corporate law doctrine may lead to a significant increase
in regulatory complexity or presence, despite the original liberalizing motive
of expanding autonomy.
III. CORPORATE RELIGIOUs RIGHTS
A. Corporate Rights or Individual Rights?
In November 2013, the normally staid field of corporate law was
thrown into the spotlight, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari for a
group of cases dealing with the assertion of corporate religious rights. In
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,68 the Supreme Court held for the first
time that for-profit corporations could claim certain exemptions from laws
of general applicability on the grounds of religion. The case was brought
under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 69
which states in relevant part that:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility . . . [unless it demonstrates that] application of the burden to
the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest.7 0
6' This takes into account only economic effects, however. It may still be the case that
these changes generate positive utility in aggregate, taking into account non-monetary benefits
such as the personal utility created by exercising religion in corporate form.
68 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (2013).
7042 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2013).
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Because the statute does not define the term "person," the issue raised
in Hobby Lobby was whether a for-profit corporation should be deemed a
person capable of exercising religion for this purpose. 7 1
At the time, Hobby Lobby, Inc. was a private corporation that operated
a for-profit, national chain of arts-and-crafts stores, employing over 13,000
people. 72 The corporation's stock was controlled by five members of the
same family.7 3 The corporation brought suit under RFRA, objecting on relig-
ious grounds to a provision in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) re-
quiring employers' health insurance plans to include coverage for certain
contraceptive methods.7 4 In its majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, the
Court held that RFRA free exercise rights may apply to certain for-profit
corporations and concluded that Hobby Lobby, Inc. should be exempt under
RFRA from the ACA's requirement of contraceptive coverage.
This Part III argues that widespread disapproval of the Hobby Lobby
decision among corporate law scholars reveals a shared vision of the corpo-
ration along certain dimensions. It suggests that centralized management of
the corporation by the board of directors and the separation of shareholders
from the corporation are and should remain central features of the corporate
form, for the sake of efficiency, even where shareholders may wish other-
wise. The conflict between this vision and the Supreme Court's in Hobby
Lobby is stark.
Consider first the powerful assertion of individual rights in Hobby
Lobby. The recognition of a corporation's free exercise rights was justified
by the Court as a mechanism for the expression of the religious rights of
individuals-rights deemed so fundamental that they demand exemption
from laws of general applicability. 76 In Justice Alito's words, "[w]hen
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people" who use corporations as "a
form of organization . . . to achieve desired ends."7 7
The Court's suggestion that corporate rights are always tied to individ-
ual rights is misleading, however, as it does not hold for many of the most
fundamental corporate rights that have been recognized in law. For example,
the corporation's longstanding right to own property in its own name is not
71 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (concluding that Congress included corporations
in RFRA's definition of "persons").
72 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
7 See id.
74 Id. at 2759. More precisely, the statute required coverage of preventive care specified
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which in turn had issued regulations
requiring coverage of contraception methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
Id. at 2762.
7 Id. at 2785.
76 Id. at 2768.
7 Id.
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based on the rights of its individual owners."8 In fact, the corporation's right
to own property is often asserted against claims by its shareholders that they
have rights to assets of the business, as we have seen.79 Recognizing the
corporation as the owner of any assets contributed to the business by the
shareholders is one of the defining features of the corporation and the key to
its success in fostering economic growth precisely because it prevents indi-
vidual shareholders from removing productive business assets at will.80 In
this case, recognizing a corporation's right to own property is the economi-
cally efficient rule specifically because it impinges on individual rights.
The same is true of other fundamental corporate rights such as the right
to enter into contracts:" the right is not based on the individual rights of the
shareholders, and once again is commonly asserted in opposition to the
desires of individual shareholders. An individual shareholder cannot repudi-
ate a corporate contract simply because the shareholder did not wish for the
corporation to enter into it. This result would hold even where shareholders
unanimously opposed the contract so long as the board of directors gave its
approval.8 2
Some of the earliest and most important common law and constitutional
or statutory rights granted to corporations are therefore expressly designed to
bind individuals to particular outcomes or decision rules that favor the
group. While such outcomes or rules are doubtless in shareholders' collective
interest ex ante-given that they are voluntarily adopted or acquiesced to-
they undeniably serve to restrict the rights of individual shareholders ex
post, when their incentives may diverge from the collective interest, in a
quasi-Rawlsian system. Thus, as we have seen, the remarkable success of the
corporation in Western capitalism is attributable at least in part to a con-
scious quashing of individual freedom-to prevent the problems of holdup,
opportunism, and other inefficient behavior by individual shareholders."
B. The Clash with Corporate Law
Of course, the Hobby Lobby opinion is correct that some corporate con-
stitutional or statutory rights are best understood as rights originating in the
underlying rights of individuals who are related to the corporation in some
" The Supreme Court has ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies not just to individuals but also to corporations. See Santa Clara County v.
S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
" See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 410-11.
s0 See id.
"8 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (recognizing
the corporation's right to enter into contracts subject to constitutional protection).
82 The sole exception is if the contract pertains to the mere handful of major corporate
events requiring a shareholder vote, such as a merger. Even in such cases, individual share-
holders are bound by the will of the majority in virtually all states. See, e.g., DEL. Coon ANN.
tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017) (requiring a majority shareholder vote to approve mergers).
8 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 54.
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fashion.8 4 For example, the recognition of a corporation's Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures 5 is justified as a device to
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the corporation's employees and of
other persons associated with the corporation.86 Yet the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion is distinguishable even from this small line of cases recognizing corpo-
rate constitutional rights as derivative of individual rights in that it is the
lone instance of fundamental corporate rights being tied specifically and ex-
clusively to the rights of its shareholders. In this way, Hobby Lobby repre-
sents a doctrinal departure from Citizens United v. FEC,7 despite the fact
that the two cases are frequently analogized.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that the government may
not prevent corporations from spending money to support or denounce indi-
vidual candidates in elections." The Court's opinion vigorously asserted the
corporation's right to engage in and affect political speech.8 9 While justified
by the majority as a means of fostering speech, the Citizens United opinion
did not (and could not) equate corporate speech with shareholder speech.
This is because corporate political speech, just like corporate advertising or
any other corporate speech, is made at the direction of the board of directors
or its officers rather than at the direction of shareholders. In a very real sense
corporate speech occurs independently of shareholders' will."0 Shareholders
could be unanimously opposed to a particular instance of corporate political
speech, yet the Court would uphold the corporation's right to engage in it at
the board's instruction.91 Consistent with this view, Citizens United recog-
nizes the right to political speech of even large public corporations whose
shareholders necessarily hold widely divergent political views.92
Whether or not Citizens United is an effective and advisable device to
advance freedom of speech, the allocation of authority in the modern corpo-
ration ensures that, in practice, corporate speech cannot be a simple conduit
for the speech of its individual shareholders.93 From a corporate law perspec-
84 See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Con-
stitutional Rights, 56 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1673, 1674 (2015) (describing certain corporate
constitutional rights as "derivative" because they are recognized solely in order to protect
individual rights).
1 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906) (holding that corporations may claim
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures but may not claim
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
16 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
8 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
as See id.
"
9 See id. at 371-72.
'o See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech
and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 497, 530-31 (2010)
(noting that political expenditures are authorized by management or the board of directors, and
shareholders do not get to vote on such decisions).
" See id.
92 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (observing that the Court has repeatedly extended First
Amendment protections to corporations).
" See Tucker, supra note 90, at 530-31.
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tive, any suggestion that corporate speech captures the speech of individual
shareholders is simple error: individual shareholders and even shareholders
acting collectively do not and may not direct corporate speech.9 4
Nonetheless, and without taking any position on its merits, the Citizens
United decision does not flout the existing corporate form in any way. Cor-
porate law has a ready means of ascertaining what constitutes identifiable
and legitimate corporate speech, where legitimacy here refers solely to the
authority to make speech, rather than to its content. The board of directors,
typically by majority vote, directs corporate actions, but may delegate much
day-to-day management decisions (including, potentially, the decision to en-
gage in political speech) to individual corporate officers.95 So long as this
chain of command is respected, corporate speech at the direction of manage-
ment is legitimate under corporate law.96 In other words, Citizens United
does not alter corporate law because it does not purport to give shareholders
the right to direct corporate speech.
The Hobby Lobby decision, by contrast, directly ties the corporation's
religious rights to the individual religious rights of the underlying sharehold-
ers.97 In doing so, Hobby Lobby clashes with fundamental principles of the
corporate form. This is so because the Hobby Lobby Court seems only to
permit a corporation to exercise its religious rights when the expression
thereof is coextensive with the views of its shareholders, or at least of its
controlling shareholder(s).98 Indeed, the Court suggests that the exercise of
religious rights would be inappropriate for public corporations, in marked
contrast to the holding in Citizens United, which expressly applied to all
corporations. 9 The implication is that, unlike the right to engage in political
expenditures recognized in Citizens United, the board of directors does not
control the corporation's right to exercise religion, notwithstanding corporate
law's directive that management of the corporation rests exclusively with the
board, rather than with the shareholders. An unstated implication of the
Hobby Lobby opinion is that its holding would not extend to a corporation
seeking a religious exemption under RFRA over the objection of its control-
94 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (allocating to the board of directors
the exclusive authority to manage the corporation).
95 Id.
96 See Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super Pac Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A
Closer Look, 79 Mo. L. REV. 283, 286-87 (2014) (noting that corporate law "provides no
mechanism" for shareholders to influence political corporate speech or political spending).
9 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding that
requiring the shareholders and their companies to comply with the HHS mandate would bur-
den their exercise of religion).
" See id. at 2774.
' See id. ("For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders-including institutional in-
vestors with their own set of stakeholders-would agree to run a corporation under the same
religious beliefs seems improbable. In any event, we have no occasion in these cases to con-
sider RFRA's applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases before us are
closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no
one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.").
2018] 203
Harvard Business Law Review
ling shareholders, 00 whereas Citizens United clearly recognizes the corpora-
tion's right to make political expenditures under precisely the same
circumstances. o1
While the Court offers no explanation for its differing treatment of
rights in these two cases, the practical result is that corporate religious rights
as recognized in Hobby Lobby remain the rights of individual shareholders,
whereas corporate speech and political spending rights under Citizens United
are truly those of the corporation, expressed and controlled by the managers
thereof in accordance with applicable state corporate law. Hobby Lobby thus
represents the greater interference with corporate law because it disregards
corporate law's bedrock principle of separation of ownership and control.
Accordingly, the Hobby Lobby decision has been criticized by corpo-
rate law scholars more often than it has been defended.1 02 Indeed, the confla-
tion of corporate action with shareholder action permitted by Hobby Lobby
has serious potential unintended consequences under corporate law. The sep-
aration of shareholders from the corporation is the basis for the recognition
of the limited liability of shareholders relative to outside creditors. Without
the guarantee of limited liability, investors would be hard-pressed to commit
capital to large business entities, effectively precluding passive investment,
and therefore the bulk of large-scale economic activity in the United
States.1 03 Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which corporate law does
not recognize shareholder limited liability, namely where a controlling
shareholder fails to respect the separateness of the corporate entity.'" Thus,
where shareholders use the corporation to exercise their personal religious
rights, it is at least arguable that creditors should in turn be permitted to
"pierce the veil" of shareholders' limited liability and pursue shareholders'
"0 See Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VANo. L. Rrv. 639, 690
(2016) ("Hobby Lobby is a landmark decision because, for the first time, the Court allowed
business corporations to opt out of generally applicable federal regulation because of the be-
liefs of the shareholders.").
1o' See Leahy, supra note 96, at 285.
102 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of
Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) [hereinafter
Amicus Curiae Brief]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71 (2015) (arguing
that Hobby Lobby is inconsistent with existing corporate law).
Even among corporate law scholars, however, there were exceptions to the widespread cri-
tique of Hobby Lobby. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law
Professors' Amicus Briefin Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1
(2014); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Low after Hobby Lobby, 70 Bus. LAW. I
(2015) (defending the Hobby Lobby majority's conclusion that state law does not require cor-
porations to pursue profit); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARiz.
L. REV. 777 (2015).
103 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94-97 (1985).
"N See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1044-45 (1991).
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personal assets, 05 a result that would surely be intolerable to the sharehold-
ers of Hobby Lobby, Inc.
A further point of doctrinal tension is the Hobby Lobby court's failure to
explain why the religious rights of shareholders should be privileged over
the religious and other rights of all other individual stakeholders of the cor-
poration.'06 If the religious rights of the corporation are derived solely from
those of its shareholders, such rights can be exercised without regard to-or
even in direct opposition to-the religious views of the corporation's em-
ployees, for example. Moreover, given that Hobby Lobby permits a corpora-
tion to claim an exemption from laws of general applicability, it further
permits the religious rights of individual shareholders to override otherwise
applicable legal rights of the corporation's employees. 07 No rationale is
given by the Court for so privileging shareholders over other individuals
associated with the corporation. Such a rationale is in contrast to the ap-
proach taken for other corporate constitutional and statutory rights such as
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which protects certain corporate employees, among others.10 The Court sim-
ply resorts to the claim that shareholders "own and control" the corpora-
tion,'09 notwithstanding that this statement is inexact both as a matter of law
and as a matter of practice.
Indeed, with respect to ownership, the corporation itself is the owner of
its assets, as we have seen. From an economic standpoint, shareholders are
one of several groups (including creditors and employees)"o having a claim
on the corporation's assets. Shareholders are commonly described as having
a "residual" claim on the corporation's cash flows: they are entitled to what
'os See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 102, at 14. (noting that the Court has held "cor-
porations and their controlling shareholders cannot invoke the corporate veil on the one hand
and ask courts to disregard it on the other").
106 See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIous LIBERTY 157 (Micah Schwartzman et al., eds. 2016).
107 See Pollman, supra note 100, at 689-90 ("Because state corporate law does not include
employees within the governance framework, give them a voice in the corporation, or protect
their interests, it is particularly important that external employee-protective laws be given ef-
fect. . . . Yet giving effect to external employee-protective law is exactly what Hobby Lobby
failed to do-it put the interests of five shareholders above those of over 13,000 employees.")
'os Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (holding that a
corporation's Fourth Amendment right protects employees and other stakeholders of the
corporation).
1o9 Id.
10 From a practical standpoint, shareholders may play a special role in the life of the
corporation, in that the original shareholders-the founder(s)-may have developed the idea
for the business, formed the entity, contributed capital or sought other investors, and may even
have imbued the corporation with a clear sense of mission or identity. But among the key
defining features of corporations are continuity of existence and, relatedly, the free transfera-
bility of its shares. Thus, founders may come and go, but the corporation remains. In particular,
the identity of shareholders is ever-changing, and they need not share any common characteris-
tics or interests other than their ownership of interests in the same entity. For this reason, the
somewhat romantic tendency to equate shareholders with founders is a conceptual error.
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remains of the corporation's assets after all creditors have been paid off."'
However, even this limited claim is fragile: both the timing and the amount
of distributions to shareholders-such as dividends-are at the discretion of
the board of directors.112
Further, shareholders do not "control" the corporation in anything
other than an indirect, limited sense. The distinguishing feature of sharehold-
ers relative to other corporate stakeholders, of course, is that they have vot-
ing rights, although even this is not required for all classes of shareholders."'
Most states limit the matters on which a shareholder vote is required to the
election of directors and approval of a handful of fundamental corporate
changes (which must first be proposed by the board of directors) such as
charter amendments and mergers."l 4 Shareholders cannot act on behalf of the
corporation, nor can they direct the actions of the corporation. Instead, an-
other defining feature of the corporation-in contrast to other business enti-
ties such as partnerships-is the mandatory allocation and centralization of
control to a board of directors, which is given the exclusive authority to
manage the corporation's business."' Thus, contrary to common assertions,
the board of directors is not the agent of shareholders." Rather, the board of
directors has independent authority and may not be compelled to act by the
shareholders-even by the controlling shareholder or the shareholders acting
unanimously.'
Instead, shareholders affect corporate policy primarily in two ways.
First, shareholders who have voting rights elect the directors, typically annu-
ally."' (Once appointed, recall that directors must exercise independent
judgment and cannot be forced to do shareholders' bidding.) Second, the
.' See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327, 338 (1983).
112 See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corpo-
ration, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 862 (2003) (noting that the decision to pay out dividends
is within the discretion of the board and that courts have typically refused to interfere absent a
showing of fraud or other complete abuse of discretion).
113 States such as Delaware permit the corporation to issue non-voting stock. Recently,
several major technology companies including Google and Facebook have issued a significant
proportion of their stock to the public as non-voting shares. See generally Joseph Ciolli, Zuck-
erberg Borrows Google Tool Splitting Stock for Control, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2016), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/zuckerberg-borrows-google-tactic-in-splitting-
stock-for-control.
'" See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 605,
609-14 (2007) (discussing the limited voting rights of shareholders, including the right to vote
on fundamental corporate changes, and concluding that the limited voting rights are even fur-
ther restricted by management's ability to control the "voting agenda").
" See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (allocating exclusive authority to manage
the corporation to the board).
116 See Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency Lens,
57 ARiz. L. REv. 269, 270 (2015).
" Various state corporate statutes permit stockholders of close corporations to opt out of
the board-managed corporate governance regime, but these alternative forms have thus far
proven unpopular. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341 (2016).
"' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2009).
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board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the corporation, and such duties
to the corporation are variously described as being owed "also to the share-
holders" or "for the benefit of the shareholders."" 9 There remains substan-
tial debate as to whether, in the case of for-profit corporations, such
fiduciary duties require the board to privilege shareholders' economic inter-
ests above all else (subject to a substantial range of discretion or margin of
error provided by the business judgment rule). 120 In all events, such fiduciary
duties do not require the board to divine the religious interests of the share-
holders, either collectively or individually, nor to seek to exercise or assert
them.
As a purported vehicle for the protection of individuals' religious rights,
the Hobby Lobby decision is thus oddly incomplete: the most that can be
said is that it allows certain shareholders of certain for-profit corporations to
obtain religious exemptions for their corporations from federal laws of gen-
eral applicability.' 2 '
C. Separate Law for For-Profit Corporations?
In reaching its decision, the Hobby Lobby Court made much of the fact
that state corporate statutes permit corporations to be formed for any lawful
purpose under state law.1 22 From this, the Court concluded that corporations
that engage in profit-seeking activities are not subject to any requirement to
do so to the exclusion of other activities such as, presumably, exercising
religion.'23 Stated differently, the Court effectively made a determination
that state law does not subject for-profit corporations to any explicit or im-
plicit mandate to maximize shareholder value. To be sure, the corporate form
is adopted by organizations of wildly different missions. This includes gov-
ernmental units such as counties, cities, and towns; not-for-profit organiza-
tions such as religious institutions, hospitals, colleges and universities, and
charities; for-profit commercial enterprises; shell holding companies; and
special-purpose vehicles that hold financial assets without conducting any
business.1 24 In fact, the for-profit commercial enterprise with which we now
"' See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280, 1287 (Del.
1989); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
120 See infra Part IV.C.
121 Justice Alito's opinion concluded, based on the facts of the case, that there was no need
to consider the application of religious exemptions to large publicly-traded corporations.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014)
122 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b)
(2018) ("A corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or
promote any lawful business or purposes ....
123 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
24 See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REv. 785, 818 (2013) (noting that special-purpose vehicles are corporations set up for
the purpose of securitizing financial assets); Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Govern-
ment, 70 VANo. L. REV. 413, 485 (2017) (noting that municipal incorporation has been used
"to escape from larger governing politics"); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Cor-
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tend to associate corporations was a relative late-comer to the form, with the
earliest incorporations in the British colonies often going to cities, towns,
and colleges, for example.'25
Although the corporate form embraces organizations of all types and
purposes, not all corporations have the same rights and duties under corpo-
rate law. Instead, the modern corporation should be understood as itself
comprised of a menu of forms from which one must select.1 26 Not-for-profit
organizations, for example, are typically formed as nonstock corporations.12 7
Thus, they have no residual claimants, precisely because they are prohibited
by state not-for-profit statutes and by Internal Revenue Code provisions
from distributing any profits to owners, directors, or officers.1 28 Thus, none
of the provisions in the state corporate statute dealing with shareholders ap-
plies to such organizations, effectively creating separate forms for stock and
nonstock corporations.1 29
The implications are significant. First, the board of directors of a non-
stock corporation is not appointed by, or beholden to, stockholders, creating
a very different set of incentives and duties.13 0 Second, although all corporate
directors and officers have fiduciary duties, there is no private mechanism
for their enforcement when the corporation lacks shareholders. Instead, pub-
lic enforcement by the IRS and the relevant state attorney general, stand in
lieu of a private right of action, entailing vastly different procedures, incen-
tives, and concerns.1'3 Necessarily, then, the fiduciary duties of the board
and officers, though stated in precisely the same terms, lead to very different
practical outcomes as between for-profit and nonprofit corporations. In for-
profit corporations, shareholders may sue the corporation to compel it to
bring suit against the relevant director(s) or officer(s) for breaches of their
poration Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 502-04 (1981) (discussing various types of enterprises
that utilize the nonprofit corporate form).
125 See JAMES WILuARD Huasr, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 3 (1970) (observing that "the first English treatise
on corporations [in 1794] has little to say, and scant authority to cite, concerning use of the
corporation for economic enterprise").
126 See infra Part I.A.
127 See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2018) (permitting "nonstock corpora-
tions" to include in their certificate of incorporation additional provisions for the management
of the business).
128 See James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2010) ("American nonprofit
organizations receive favorable tax treatment, including tax exemptions and tax-deductibility
of contributions, in return for their devotion to charitable purposes and restrictions not to dis-
tribute profits.").
129 See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 114 (2018) (applying distinct provisions to nonstock
corporations). Note also that the Delaware General Corporation Law distinguishes between
nonstock corporations (corporations not authorized to issue stock), nonprofit nonstock corpo-
rations (nonstock corporations lacking membership interests) and charitable nonstock corpora-
tions (nonprofit nonstock corporations exempt from taxation under § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code).130 See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(j) (2018).
' See WEr, GoTsHAL & MANGEs LLP, THE GuIDE TO NoT-FOR-PROFIT GOVERNANCE 1-
2 (2012).
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fiduciary duties. 3 2 No other corporate constituency such as employees, cus-
tomers, or suppliers is given the same right.' 33
By giving shareholders the sole means of enforcing directors' fiduciary
duties, as well as making them solely responsible for electing the board of
directors, corporate law ensures as a practical matter that the board is incen-
tivized to favor shareholders over other corporate constituencies.13 4 It is for
this reason that management's fiduciary duties are said to be owed to the
corporation for the benefit of shareholders. What benefit do shareholders
expect? If the corporation is engaged in commercial activity, shareholder
wealth maximization would seem to be the logical default expectation. In
order to modify this default expectation, the corporation would need to ex-
plicitly state an alternative mission in its charter, such that shareholders and
future shareholders would be put on notice that the corporation could pursue
alternative objectives.'35
To be sure, directors in for-profit corporations are given substantial lee-
way to authorize corporate actions that do not appear to be profit-maximiz-
ing. For example, the law has long recognized that some portion of corporate
assets may be contributed to charity,' 6 that corporations may pay above-
market wages to their employees, and that they may reject takeover offers
even where they would result in shareholders receiving a substantial pre-
mium over the current market price.'37 This permissiveness should not be
131 Shareholders are not permitted to bring suit directly for a breach of fiduciary duty,
given that such duties are nominally owed to the corporation itself. Instead, such rights are
enforced indirectly, through the mechanism of a shareholder derivative suit against the corpo-
ration, to compel it to bring suit for the alleged breach.
m A limited exception exists when the corporation has crossed the threshold into insol-
vency. In that case, the board of directors' fiduciary duties are deemed to be for the benefit not
only of shareholders, but also of creditors. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found.,
Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007). The rationale is that when shareholders have
little or no expectation of recovery, their incentives are no longer to maximize the value of the
corporation, which would inure solely to the corporation's creditors. Rather, their incentive is
either to be careless with the corporation's remaining assets or to take undue risks in the hope
that the corporation will escape insolvency. Nonetheless, even in such cases, creditors may not
bring direct fiduciary duty claims. See id.
1' See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of Shareholders, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 442 (2006) ("Fiduciary duties and shareholder approval requirements limit director auton-
omy, and the right to elect directors is intended to keep directors accountable to the
shareholders.").
` This is not intended to suggest that the longstanding debate over the degree to which
so-called "shareholder primacy" has been incorporated into law has been resolved. The com-
peting positions were famously staked out in the classic debate between Professor E. Merrick
Dodd of Harvard and Professor Adolf Berle of Columbia in the Depression era. See Adolf A.
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. RnV. 1365 (1932);
Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HAley. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E.
Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
For more recent treatments, see William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Busi-
ness Corporation, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 261 (1992); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999); Hansmann & Kraak-
man, supra note 9.
11 6 See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953).
m See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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interpreted as a violation of the norm of shareholder profit-maximization,
however. Rather, state corporate law's deference to such behavior should be
interpreted in one or more of the following ways.
First, such deference reflects the refusal of judges-who primarily de-
termine the content of fiduciary duties in corporate law-to police every
managerial decision.' By giving management broad latitude to manage the
corporation's affairs, courts avoid having to make what are effectively diffi-
cult business decisions for which they are not well qualified. Even if it al-
lows some conduct that is not in shareholders' interest, such deference
satisfies the broader interest in encouraging qualified individuals to take up
management positions and to avoid excessive conservatism in their decision-
making on behalf of the corporation.'39 Thus, although the application of this
rule to a particular corporation may result in some non-profit-maximizing
behavior, it arguably results overall in greater corporate profits.
Second, conduct that does not appear to be profit-maximizing in the
short term may well be profit-maximizing in the longer term. Giving dona-
tions to charity may breed goodwill among customers, for example, or facili-
tate the recruiting of employees in a competitive market for skilled labor.140
Similarly, since the time of Henry Ford, it has been at least a plausible view
that paying above-market wages can be profit-maximizing for the firm, be-
cause it may generate loyalty among employees.141
Thus, the broad latitude for corporate management to behave in ways
that are not obviously profit-maximizing does not contradict the previously
stated principle that the default assumption for a commercial enterprise
should be that its primary objective is to maximize shareholder wealth.1 42
In the specific context of corporate takeovers, there is a line of court
decisions and, in some states, statutory provisions (referred to as "constitu-
ency statutes") explicitly permitting managers to take into account the inter-
ests of constituencies and stakeholders other than shareholders.1 43 Unlike the
case law discussed above, these are truly departures from the norm of share-
holder wealth maximization. Yet they are limited to a specific, politically
charged context. Corporate managers often have incentives to resist an unso-
licited takeover bid because it puts them at risk of losing their position
' See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doc-
trine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is best under-
stood "as a doctrine of abstention").
"' See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating
that "[s]hareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse").
140 See A.P. Smith Mfg., 98 A.2d at 585 (noting that corporate charitable donations may
have "indirect benefit accruing to the corporations").
141 See Tim Worstall, The Story of Henry Ford's $5 a Day Wages: It's Not What You Think,
FoRBES (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/04/the-story-of-
henry-fords-5-a-day-wages-its-not-what-you-think/#400289ab766d.
142 See Strine, supra note 102, at 76 (stating that "[u]nder existing corporate law, at least
in Delaware, the duty of the board of directors is to maximize profit for stockholders").
14 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituency Statutes:
Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990).
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within the target company. During the height of corporate takeovers in the
1980s, managers began lobbying state legislatures to grant them additional
authority to resist such bids.144 In turn, state legislatures and judges were
often receptive to these appeals, due to the political saliency of local compa-
nies being acquired by out-of-state "corporate raiders," who might engage
in major layoffs to cut costs.1 45 States' varied responses included court deci-
sions giving managers wide latitude to reject hostile takeover bids, to adopt
poison pills and other ex ante takeover defenses, or to consider the interests
of other corporate stakeholders (such as employees and local communities)
in considering takeover bids.1 46 In light of their specific context and limited
purpose, constituency statutes should not be interpreted as permitting man-
agers to depart wholesale from the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization.
In Delaware, the reigning champion in the competition to attract corpo-
rate charters,1 47 the jurisprudence has not been especially clear on the extent
to which directors and officers must pursue shareholder wealth-maximiza-
tion, in large part because it is unwilling to acknowledge the seeming con-
flict between the court's takeover cases and the larger context of the
corporation's ordinary business operations. Nonetheless, even within the
context of corporate takeovers, the Delaware courts have recently suggested
that managers of for-profit corporations are bound to maximize shareholder
wealth. 148
One need not resolve the extent to which the norm of shareholder
wealth-maximization is in fact incorporated into and enforceable under state
corporate law, however. Nor need one resolve precisely how the courts do or
should determine whether a particular corporation should be deemed a for-
profit business. For our purposes, it is enough to conclude that, in practice,
there is a distinction in both governance and fiduciary duties under state
corporate law between nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and that the
latter owe some measure of privileged allegiance to shareholders. Thus,
within the vast umbrella of state corporate law, for-profit corporations
` See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 14, 24-25 (1992).
145 See id. (discussing the political considerations of the Pennsylvania legislature, the first
state to adopt a constituency statute).
146 See Allen, supra note 135, at 275-76.
147 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & EcoN. 383, 389-91 (2003) (providing evidence that Delaware attracts vastly more in-
corporations of large enterprises than any other state).
148 The Delaware courts have at times been willing to tether directors' fiduciary duties
explicitly to a standard of shareholder wealth maximization. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Directors of a for-profit Delaware
corporation cannot deploy a [poison pill takeover defense] to defend a business strategy that
openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization-at least not consistently with the director's
fiduciary duties under Delaware law.").
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should be understood as constituting a separate form, notwithstanding the
Hobby Lobby Court's conclusion to the contrary. 149
D. The Effects of Recognizing Corporate Religious Rights
The Hobby Lobby ruling is likely at odds with economic efficiency, a
point that even the Court might well concede. Hobby Lobby creates an une-
ven playing field among for-profit corporations and provides a potentially
serious competitive advantage to firms whose particular governance struc-
ture and shareholder identities enable them to claim exemptions from laws
of general applicability on religious grounds. When the legal burden that a
corporation seeks to avoid is costly, the competitive advantage of obtaining
an exemption from such laws can be significant. In- other contexts, by con-
trast, concerns about unfair competition among corporations with different
legal rights and obligations have been addressed by attempting to eliminate
the uneven playing field. Complaints about the unfair advantage of tax-ex-
empt firms engaging in ordinary commerce led to the tax principle that such
firms must pay tax on all income that is "unrelated" to their tax-exempt
mission.150
To be sure, there is a theoretical efficiency argument for permitting re-
ligious exemptions for corporations. If it were the case that large swaths of
the population avoided for-profit economic activity entirely due to the un-
availability of religious exemptions from federal rules of general applicabil-
ity, then this ex ante chilling of business could serve as an efficiency
rationale for awarding corporations religious rights. Yet our modem econ-
omy belies this claim, by attracting broad participation from individuals of
most all religious persuasions."' In addition, recall that the Hobby Lobby
decision protects only the rights of certain individuals when engaged in
commerce, namely those of controlling shareholders, even when in conflict
with those of the corporation's far more numerous employees.'52
Finally, granting corporations religious exemptions from laws of gen-
eral applicability effectively guarantees an increase in regulatory complex-
ity. The Hobby Lobby case itself prompted HHS to propose a new round of
regulations addressing claims for religious exemption from the ACA's re-
quirement of insurance coverage for contraception.' Nor did litigation over
149 The remainder of this Article considers only for-profit corporations, and references to
corporate law are to the law of for-profit corporations.
`s See I.R.C. § 512 (2018) (subjecting to income taxation the "unrelated business taxable
income" of otherwise tax-exempt entities).
' ' The Amish community presents a notable exception. See Stephen T. Knudsen, The
Education of the Amish Child, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1506, 1506 (1974) (describing the Old Order
Amish as living in "self-contained agrarian communities insulated from the larger society").
152 See supra Part I.A.
153 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018).
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religious exemptions from the ACA end with Hobby Lobby.15 4 Henceforth,
not only will legislators and regulatory agencies need to account and plan for
the possibility that for-profit businesses will seek exemption from their laws
and regulations on religious grounds, but the courts will have to grapple with
a wave of difficult cases involving such claims. Further, the uncertainty over
whether a for-profit corporation's exercise of religious rights should permit
creditors to "pierce the veil" of shareholder limited liability is likely to cast
a shadow over corporate law for some time to come. 5 s
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENTS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. The Case for Fiduciary Duties
Any business activity involving more than one person faces the prob-
lem of agency costs.'56 Employees may not work as diligently as their em-
ployer would like. One partner in a business may subject the other partners
to liability for her tortious conduct. Corporate managers may pay themselves
bigger salaries than what shareholders deem justified. Agency costs arise
whenever one party (the agent) is expected to do something for another party
(the principal) or act on behalf of that party. They arise because the incen-
tives of the principal and the agent necessarily differ to some degree, and the
principal lacks perfect information about the agent's effort and ability.' 7
This mismatch in incentives and information creates three types of
costs."' First, the principal may incur costs in order to better align the agent's
behavior with the principal's wishes (referred to as "monitoring costs"),.
such as security cameras for employees or incentive compensation for man-
agement.'59 Second, the agent itself may incur costs in order to signal his or
her quality or good behavior to the principal (referred to as "bonding
costs"), such as where lawyers choose to associate with a reputable law
firm.16 0 Finally, because monitoring and bonding cannot ensure that agents
will perfectly fulfill the principal's wishes, there will always be some
residual loss in social welfare-referred to as the deadweight loss.'16
15 See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate
Power Ratchet: The Courts' Role in Eroding We the People's Ability to Constrain Our Corpo-
rate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 423, 458 (2016) (describing the "litany of legal
challenges" that has resulted from the Hobby Lobby decision).
"' See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the
Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 Green Bag 2d 235 (2013).
'56 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 309 (defining agency costs).
'5 See generally JEAN-JACQUEs LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCEN-
TIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MOi)EL (2002).
158 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308 (describing the three types of agency
costs).
1 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
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The corporate form imposes a particular agency cost that has generated
a vast literature. As discussed, one of the distinctive features of the corpora-
tion compared to other types of business association is its governance struc-
ture with centralized management and delegation to the board of directors.16 2
Rather than manage the affairs of the business themselves, corporate share-
holders elect a board of directors, which is given exclusive management au-
thority, subject to a very limited set of mandatory shareholder approval
rights. In turn, the board of directors may delegate some management au-
thority to officers, who in addition are charged with executing the board's
directives.
The distinctive quality of corporate-style delegated management among
business entities is perhaps best illustrated by contrast with the traditional
model of the general partnership. In a general partnership, the partners not
only have economic stakes in the business but also manage it as co-equals.163
By contrast, the corporation has long been characterized by the "separation
of ownership and control": shareholders hold rights to the residual profits of
the business, but do not control the business. 16 4 Instead, they delegate man-
agement to the board, which is given independent authority to direct the
corporation's actions.I65
In an economic sense, then, shareholders of a corporation may be
viewed as principals, and "management" (a term used very loosely to refer
to both the board of directors and executive officers) is their agent. As a
legal matter, however, the board of directors is assuredly not the agent of
shareholders, because shareholders cannot issue direct orders to the board or
otherwise control its behavior-the hallmarks of an agency relationship rec-
ognized in law.'66 Once the board has been appointed, shareholders have no
ability to intervene in the firm's management beyond a very limited set of
veto rights with respect to major corporate events, such as mergers, charter
amendments, and liquidation, the power to elect and remove directors, and
the right to amend the corporation's by-laws.'67 This insulation of boards
from shareholder control, combined with the vast chasm that can exist be-
tween information about the firm held by management versus shareholders,
significantly increases the potential for management conduct to deviate from
shareholders' wishes.
The greater the number of passive shareholders and the greater the size
and complexity of the corporation, the greater the potential for such agency
costs of management, as the asymmetry between shareholder and manage-
162 See CLARK, supra note 26.
163 See REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401 (NAT'L CONFERENCE or COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997).
'" See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 55.
165 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018) (allocating to the board of directors the exclu-
sive authority to manage the corporation).
66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (limiting agency
relationships to ones in which the agent acts "subject to the principal's control").
167 See Velasco, supra note 114, at 609-14.
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ment's information grows and the ability and incentives of individual share-
holders to monitor management declines. 6 ' Thus, large, public corporations,
in which shareholders are thought to be relatively dispersed, present the pro-
totypical illustration of the agency costs inherent in delegated management.
While contractual and other private-ordering solutions abound for miti-
gating the agency costs of management, corporate law provides a powerful
tool: directors' fiduciary duties.169 Such duties are typically defined and re-
fined by state common law rather than by corporate statutes. Fiduciary duties
impose broad standards of conduct on directors and allow for their enforce-
ment through shareholder lawsuits.170 The two principal duties that directors
owe to the corporation are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.171 The
duty of care requires directors to act prudently and attentively in managing
the corporation's affairs.' 72 Although resembling a simple negligence stan-
dard as stated, the duty of care is in fact subject to a much stricter threshold
for liability-more akin to gross negligence or recklessness-by application
of the "business judgment rule," which imposes both procedural and sub-
stantive limitations on liability for a breach of the duty of care.1 73
The duty of loyalty simply requires directors to act in the interests of
the corporation, and in particular to place the corporation's interests above
their own.1 74 Behavior that could give rise to a violation of the duty of loy-
alty includes self-dealing transactions, taking a business opportunity away
from the corporation (the "corporate opportunity" doctrine), diverting cor-
porate assets, taking actions to entrench one's position as director or officer
of the corporation, or providing false or deceptive information to sharehold-
ers. 75 With notable exceptions (discussed below), directors are held person-.
ally liable for breaches of their fiduciary duties to the corporation.1 76
The fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors and officers may
smack of romantic notions of fairness or stark paternalism. Over time, how-
168 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WrHOUT PERFORMANCE. THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006).
161 This Article focuses on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Corporate officers
are subject to the same fiduciary duties as directors as well as to additional fiduciary duties,
because unlike directors they are true agents of the corporation. See Deborah DeMott, Corpo-
rate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847, 848 (2017).
170 See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 357,
368-69 (2016).
171 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 4.01, 4.16 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
7 2 See id. § 4.01.
173 See id. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND AcQuISrIoNS 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff
Solomon eds., 2016) (describing the role of the business judgment rule as presumption, stan-
dard of care, abstention doctrine, and substantive rule of law).
174 See Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939) (stating that the duty requires
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation).
1 See Kelli A. Alces, Larry Ribstein's Fiduciary Duties, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1765,
1772-74 (2014) (describing the duty of loyalty).
176 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017) (prohibiting corporations from eliminat-
ing personal liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty).
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ever, the justification for fiduciary duties has been grounded in efficiency
rationales.'n The idea is that it would be infeasible to specify in perfect de-
tail the optimal relationship between shareholders and corporate manage-
ment. Whether or not one adopts the view that corporate charters and by-
laws are best analogized to contracts between shareholders and directors,
they are not complete contracts. 78 It is not possible for the "parties" to fore-
see every event in their ongoing relationship and to specify what the out-
come should be, particularly given that both shareholders and managers
come and go over time. Even if it were possible, the transaction costs of
doing so would vastly outweigh the benefits.
Thus, either corporate organizational documents are incomplete con-
tracts or they are not contracts at all,17 9 because they leave open material
questions regarding the relationship between shareholders and management.
As with other ongoing commercial relationships involving uncertainty (such
as long-term supply contracts), there are ways to mitigate this problem. For
example, the documents can include standards, rather than bright-line rules,
as gap-fillers to be interpreted and enforced by the courts ex post.' 0 In sub-
stance, this is the approach taken by corporate law in imposing fiduciary
duties on management for the benefit of the corporation. Such duties amount
to broadly-worded standards of conduct for management, the precise appli-
cation of which will be determined by the courts. ' 8 Thus, while the "duty of
loyalty" may have the ring of lofty ideals far removed from the hard-nosed
reality of modern businesses, it is offered as a practical legal solution to a
pernicious problem in corporate governance that at least arguably maximizes
economic efficiency.
How so? The ideal case is as follows. If investors know that manage-
ment fiduciary duties are a mandatory term in the corporate "contract," they
can invest their money in the firm with considerably less fear of losing their
investment due to bad behavior by management. This safety net will thereby
encourage capital-raising and its efficient allocation. Further, investors can
expend significantly fewer resources on conducting due diligence on man-
agement ex ante and monitoring management's behavior ex post, both of
which are necessary preconditions to massive capital-raising from dispersed,
"' See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L.
& PoL'Y. REv. 265, 329 (1998).
" See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
EcONOMETRICA 755, 755-56 (1988).
1' See generally Ann M. Lipton, Manufafctured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583 (2016) (arguing that corporate
charters and bylaws are not contractual).
80 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 845 (2006).
' See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Direc-
tor Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 Bus. LAW. 761, 763-64
(2008) ("The standards of conduct and liability already incorporate the necessary flexibility to
balance the potentially competing duties of constituency directors with protection of the inter-
ests of the corporate entity or other corporate constituencies under most circumstances.").
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passive investors. Thus, the argument goes, fiduciary duties dramatically
lessen the transaction costs of raising capital.182 Finally, they facilitate the
locking-in of capital contributed to the business: investors can commit their
funds to the corporation indefinitely, secure in the knowledge that even as
individual directors and officers come and go over time, they will always be
bound to serve shareholder interests rather than their own private interests.'83
Were this not the case, investors might only trust managers with whom they
were familiar and had previously vetted, rather than potentially entrusting
their capital to several different cohorts of managers as yet unknown to
them.
B. Curbing or Eliminating Fiduciary Duties
Through an early analogy of the corporation to a trust, the law has im-
posed fiduciary duties in corporate management ever since the modern cor-
poration arose.1 84 Increasingly, however, state corporate law has proved
willing to allow business entities, including now the corporation, to waive
their managers' fiduciary duties to varying degrees. The push began with the
duty of care. In Smith v. Van Gorkom,'85 a famous Delaware takeover case,.
the directors of a major corporation were held personally liable for breaching
their duty of care to the corporation because they approved a takeover bid
based only on a cursory presentation from the potentially self-interested
chief executive officer.'8 6 In response, the Delaware legislature revised its
corporate statute so as to permit directors to be fully exculpated from the
duty of care through a provision in the corporate charter.18 7 Ever since, it has
become the standard practice for public corporations to waive directors' duty
of care in this manner.' 8 The change in law does not appear to have had a
material effect on management behavior, however, perhaps in part due to the
fact that corporations were already permitted to indemnify directors for most
breaches of this duty and to purchase insurance policies against director and
officer liability.'8 9
182 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1550-51 (1989) (noting that the inclusion of fiduciary duties as a term in corporate
law reduces transaction costs).
83 Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEo. L.J.
889, 905-10 (2006); see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 392-93, 433-34 (describing
how the doctrinal fiction of the corporation as a separate legal entity serves to facilitate capital
lock-in).
184 See J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the Dela-
ware Uniform Contribution Act, II DEL. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (2010).
' 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
86 Id. at 893-94.
'8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017).
8 Tamar Frankel, What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations: What Understand-
ing Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 697 (2006).
"' See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2017).
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The drive to pare back fiduciary duties did not end there, however.
Most notoriously, states such as Nevada permit corporations to eliminate
virtually all of managers' fiduciary duties to the corporation-that is, not
only the duty of care, but also the duty of loyalty.190 Nevada subsequently
took this approach one step further, by setting this option-that is, the
waiver of all fiduciary duties-as the default for Nevada corporations.1 9 '
Thus, unless Nevada corporations draft their charters so as to affirmatively
impose fiduciary duties, all such duties are automatically eliminated by oper-
ation of state corporate law. In keeping with the wealth of studies in behav-
ioral economics suggesting that setting default options has a material impact
on final outcomes,1 92 this change in Nevada's default alone resulted in a ma-
jor increase in the share of Nevada corporations in which fiduciary duties
were eliminated entirely. 93
Based on legislative history, the impetus for eliminating all fiduciary
duties is two-fold. The first is a desire to reduce the amount of shareholder
litigation affecting public companies, on the view that it amounts to a tax on
business with little or no offsetting benefits. The second (and related) goal is
simply to grant entrepreneurs and managers more autonomy. As discussed
below, however, while individual managers and founders may well wish to
avoid the albatross of fiduciary duties, shareholders collectively may be
worse off when fiduciary duties are eliminated entirely, as discussed in the
next section.
C. The Effects of Eliminating Fiduciary Duties
As a group, corporate law scholars are generally highly supportive of
private ordering. However, they display more unease over Nevada's steps to
eliminate all mandatory fiduciary duties than over prior steps to liberalize
management fiduciary duties, such as by allowing exculpation of the duty of
care or allowing targeted waivers of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
What is proving particularly troubling to scholars about this development?
The near-total elimination of fiduciary duties in Nevada corporate law re-
calls many of the characteristics of the Hobby Lobby decision: it alters the
traditional corporate form; it expands individual autonomy (in this case, for
entrepreneurs and managers, rather than shareholders); its economic effects
are highly uncertain; and, it is likely to lead to an increase in regulatory
complexity or involvement.
90 For a detailed description of the relevant Nevada statutory provisions and their history,
see Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdic-
tion, 98 VA. L. Rpv. 935 (2012).
' See id. at 951-52.
192 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings
Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EcONOMICS OP AGING 81-126 (David A. Wise ed., 2007).
'9 See Barzuza, supra note 190, at 953.
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As an initial matter, there are many reasons why even shareholders
might not wish for an expansive duty of care. Subjecting directors to the risk
of personal liability for negligent decision-making comes with associated
costs. For example, directors will be more risk-averse than is warranted to
maximize shareholder value; qualified candidates will be discouraged from
becoming directors or will require substantial additional compensation or
insurance; and the potential for judicial error in enforcement is high, given
that courts are poorly equipped to judge the merits of business decisions and
are subject to hindsight bias.1 94 Moreover, the courts' longstanding applica-
tion of the business judgment rule already dramatically diminishes the duty
of care as a check on board action.
The case for the duty of loyalty in the corporate context is considerably
stronger than for the duty of care, however. If managers are not acting with
the corporation's interests in mind, what is their conceivable purpose or role?
It is worth noting that all corporate employees are subject to a duty of loy-
alty-directors are hardly being singled out for heightened standards of con-
duct. One response is to argue that the burden of shareholder litigation over
fiduciary duties outweighs any advantage to imposing fiduciary duties on
directors. There is a widespread sense that a non-negligible proportion of
shareholder litigation is meritless, and evidence is mixed as to whether
shareholder litigation is an effective means of disciplining management.9 5
Yet in contrast to claims of breach of the duty of care, the potential for error
in duty of loyalty cases is much lower, because courts need not weigh the
merits of business decisions. 9 6 Rather, they are simply asked to determine
whether the board was disloyal, such as by succumbing to a serious conflict
of interest-a task far better suited to judges' institutional competence.'19
Notwithstanding, there are situations in which an unmitigated and ill-
defined duty of loyalty need not be optimal for investors. The most common
example is that of the corporate opportunity doctrine discussed above. '9
Typically, the duty of loyalty would require directors to refrain from usurp-
ing business opportunities that could plausibly have been pursued by the
corporation and generally to avoid competing with the corporation.1 99 None-
theless, there are discrete situations in which it would be at least arguably
19 See, e.g., Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. Come. L.
647, 659-66 (2015) (discussing potential undesirable consequences of the duty of care); Gag-
liardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
'" See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs through Private
Litigation in the U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes (September 2, 2015) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Scholarship Repository).
196 See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 56, at 1662.
'9 See, e.g., id. (noting that the duty of loyalty has been narrowly defined in order to
reduce the "potential for error").
" See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loy-
alty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075
(2017) (finding that more than one thousand U.S. public companies have adopted corporate
opportunity waivers, and offering an efficiency rationale for such waivers).
'
9 9 See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939).
2018] 219
Harvard Business Law Review
advantageous for shareholders to waive this duty.200 Imagine, for example,
uniquely skilled entrepreneurs, each involved in their own existing busi-
nesses, who decide that they would like to collaborate on a project. Potential
investors in the new project may well decide that they are willing to allow
the entrepreneurs to continue their existing businesses, and even to pursue
new business opportunities in the same industry, so long as they devote a
certain level of time and attention to the project being considered. Similarly,
in the investment management context, investment principals of private in-
vestment funds may wish to form new funds with the same investment strat-
egy as one or more of their existing funds. If they have a successful enough
track record, investors may decide that being given the opportunity to invest
with these managers is valuable enough that they will grant managers the
right to form such successor funds.
Yet the situations described above, in which a waiver of the prohibition
on usurping corporate opportunities may be warranted, all involve discrete
fact patterns that are foreseen up front, are acknowledged as part of the busi-
ness deal between managers and investors, and can be expressly contracted
for. Current law in key jurisdictions already permits precisely this type of
waiver.201 Such tailored waivers, obtained with informed, express share-
holder pre-approval, are a far cry from a blanket elimination of the entire
duty of loyalty. The latter exculpates conduct that need not be foreseen or
even foreseeable by shareholders, including a host of self-dealing transac-
tions that could only harm shareholder interests. Further, given the dramatic
effect that simply reversing the default option had on the number of Nevada
corporations waiving all fiduciary duties, one cannot reasonably claim that
all such waivers were specifically negotiated with shareholders and received
their express blessing. Rather, the implication is that the shareholders of
most such corporations likely had no inkling of the issue whatsoever.
To be sure, many unincorporated entities such as limited liability com-
panies and limited partnerships also permit such broad waivers of fiduciary
duties.202 Whether or not this is advisable as a public policy matter, there are
relevant distinctions between corporations and alternative entities that must
be considered. In contrast to corporations, alternative entities typically re-
quire considerable affirmative contracting to set up because the default terms
will often be totally unsuitable to the proposed business arrangement. In
contrast to corporate charters and by-laws, which tend to be short and almost
entirely standardized, limited liability company agreements or limited part-
nership agreements may be extraordinarily complex, lengthy documents. 203
200 H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, but
Will Anyone Follow? 16 NEv. L.J. 1085, 1090 (2016) (discussing potential beneficial reasons
for waiving the duty of loyalty).
201 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017).
202 For a summary of state-law developments in this direction, see Pace, supra note 200.
203 See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Dissociation of a Member from a Louisiana Limited Liability
Company: The Need for Reform, 66 LA. L. REV. 365, 371-72 (2006) (noting that most operat-
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Alternative entities thus put the investor on notice that their terms are non-
uniform and may be bargained-for, and that there is little judicial, equitable
backstop to the relationship.204 With corporations, by contrast, the primary
purpose of the form is to obviate investors' need to inquire into the precise
terms of the arrangement.
Thus, while there is an efficiency justification for eliminating fiduciary
duties (namely, the desire to decrease shareholder litigation), there are also
considerable efficiency justifications for retaining at least the core of the
duty of loyalty.205 Given how recently these changes in state law have been
implemented, there is limited empirical evidence on the question, and the
available results are mixed. On the one hand, there is evidence that smaller,
lower-quality corporations may be self-selecting into Nevada as a result of
its heavily management-friendly corporate law. 206 On the other hand, there is
also evidence that such firms' value may actually increase under a regime
without fiduciary duties. 207 The suggestion is that the costs of fiduciary du-
ties may outweigh the benefits for certain small, insider-dominated firms. 208
If that is so, then there is at least the possibility of a relatively efficient
outcome overall. Firms that benefit from fiduciary duties may remain in ju-
risdictions that impose them, while firms that do not benefit from fiduciary
duties can incorporate in jurisdictions such as Nevada that eliminate them,
which would result in the optimal outcome for shareholders collectively.
Yet there are reasons to believe that such a regime would not provide a
stable equilibrium in the long run. First, and most importantly, there is no
assurance that the trend of waiving or eliminating fiduciary duties will re-
main confined to smaller entities. Managers (and the law firms that represent
them) have a strong incentive to reduce their potential for personal liability
(and the distraction of shareholder litigation) regardless of the effect on firm
value, and so may be inclined to eliminate fiduciary duties if given the
choice. Similarly to what occurred with waivers of the duty of care, it seems
almost inevitable that if Delaware were to permit corporations to waive the
duty of loyalty, management would take up the offer. Thus, over time the
standard practice may be for even the largest firms to eliminate all of man-
agement's fiduciary duties, whether or not it is value-maximizing for
shareholders.
ing agreements are lengthy and complicated and that some individuals avoid entering into such
agreements due to the agreements' complexity).
204 See Ribstein, supra note 51, at 230 (noting that investors may distrust new forms due
to uncertainties regarding the protections afforded by such forms).
205 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41
TULSA L. REv. 451, 474-76 (2006) (discussing the negative implications of allowing parties to
eliminate the duty of loyalty through contractual waivers).
206 See Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into
Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STun. 3593, 3594 (2014).
207 See Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from
Nevada (August 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
208 Id.
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Second, for small enterprises, as we have seen, there are valid alterna-
tive forms of organization that would accomplish precisely the same pur-
pose. The parties could form a limited liability company, for example, as
many states permit the elimination of fiduciary duties in such entities. 209 And
if the investors in these businesses prefer the corporate model of having a
board of directors, limited liability statutes permit them to precisely replicate
the corporate governance structure by contract in the operating agreement.210
The push to eliminate corporate management's fiduciary duties entirely
is a push to alter the existing corporate form, even though alternative forms
exist to achieve this purpose. The corporation's clearest advantage and
crowning achievement is the facilitation of large-scale, private economic ac-
tivity. Thus, although they represent a relatively small share of the overall
population of corporations, large corporations do and should hold dispropor-
tionate sway on corporate law and corporate governance.21 ' Modifying the
corporate form to satisfy the desires of a small segment of corporate activ-
ity-when the same end is already available by other means-makes for bad
corporate law.
A different case could be made if fiduciary duties were demonstrably
value-decreasing for large corporations. Fiduciary duties are mixed bless-
ings, even for large corporations. Large, public companies are plagued with
lawsuits, and even the staunchest defenders of shareholder rights would be
hard pressed to suggest that there is currently a strong connection between
shareholder suits and the merits. 2 12 At a minimum, such suits are a distrac-
tion for management, and they likely alter some executives' preferences for
taking jobs at public companies versus private ones.213 Further, such suits
may prompt founders to keep their firms private. Yet as we have seen, there
are significant efficiency gains from subjecting managers to fiduciary duties,
as this allows shareholders to remain entirely passive with respect to their
investment in the corporation, which after all is the condition precedent to
capital-raising from the general public.2 14 At the very least, it remains uncer-
tain whether the benefits of reducing shareholder litigation over fiduciary
duties would offset the efficiency losses in drafting corporate charters. This
is simply an empirical question, and it is unlikely to be resolved in the near
future. In the meantime, the scholarly criticism of Nevada's corporate statute
209 See BEBCHUK & FiRiEo, supra note 168; Mobsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under
Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP.
L. 555, 561-62 (2012).
210 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-402 (2017).
211 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 454-56.
212 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 195.
213 See Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When are Shareholder Suits in
Shareholder Interests?, 82 Go. L.J. 1733, 1738 (1994) (noting that derivative suits increase
the expenses incurred by corporations in attracting top management candidates).
214 See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 262
(2009) ("According to agency cost theories, the purpose of fiduciary duties is to preserve the
efficiency gained by delegating powers to someone more qualified."); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 103.
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suggests that even among contractarians, there are limits to what private or-
dering is viewed as efficient or as to what is recognized as a truly bargained-
for outcome in the first place.
Finally, it is not necessarily clear that eliminating fiduciary duties in
large, public corporations would materially decrease shareholder litigation or
overall regulatory intervention in corporate affairs. 215 What precisely does it
mean for a director to have no duty of loyalty whatsoever to shareholders or
to the corporation? Taken literally, it would suggest that directors could sim-
ply gamble away the corporation's money, or use corporate property to ad-
vance the director's private business interests. Absent a duty of loyalty,
charlatans could abuse the corporate form, thereby increasing the number of
disputes between shareholders and managers, whether they gave rise to justi-
ciable claims or not. It is doubtful that courts or legislatures would simply
stand by and permit such behavior on a large scale, particularly where unso-
phisticated parties were involved. Thus, while the law may nominally permit
waivers of the duty of loyalty, in the end, the courts are likely to intervene
through other doctrines 216 or to develop new doctrine to plug the gaping
holes in the dyke. 217 Not only would this have the paradoxical effect of in-
creasing regulatory intervention, it would create substantial legal uncertainty
in the interim, which, as we are so often told, is bad for business.
CONCLUSION
At a time when business organizational law largely defers to private
ordering, one might reasonably ask whether it is still possible to ascribe any
substance to "the corporation" as a legal form, or whether there is any justi-
fication for maintaining distinct business entity types at all. The negative
reactions to certain recent developments in corporate law suggest that most
corporate law scholars would answer both questions in the affirmative.
There is indeed such a thing as the corporate form, and it has content beyond
what any or even all interested parties may provide. Today, the for-profit
corporation is best understood as a governance model with a particular goal,
which is to facilitate large-scale economic activity.
215 See Dibadj, supra note 205, at 476 ("In corporate law, the unintended consequence of
relaxing fiduciary duties has been to impose increasingly burdensome layers of mandatory
regulation to stem malfeasance . . . .").
"' Eliminating the duty of loyalty would likely result in the courts giving greater substan-
tive content to directors' and officers' duty of good faith, particularly given the lingering uncer-
tainty over whether such a duty exists independently of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that the duty to act in good faith "does not
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duty of care and
loyalty").
217 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1618, 1620 (noting that while the U.S. permits
greater contractual freedom in corporate law than other common law jurisdictions, this ap-
proach is necessarily coupled with "greater judicial activism in reading implied terms into the
corporate contract and in monitoring for opportunism").
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As a device for efficient capital-raising and profit-seeking activity, the
corporate form necessarily promotes collective action: it organizes or con-
strains individual action and voice so as to yield better outcomes for the
group. Given this premise, increasing individual autonomy or rights ex post
by altering the corporate form can eventually prove counter-productive.
What little autonomy gains are to be had in this context may come at the cost
of inefficiency, greater regulatory complexity or involvement, doctrinal un-
certainty, and the loss of an identifiable, rational regulatory design.
Corporate law cannot be everything to everyone. While individuals
may chafe at various prohibitions, isolated cases need not detract from the
merits of an efficient regulatory design. If for-profit corporations are a net
social benefit, then we have reason to preserve the elements of the form and
defend its boundaries, rather than bend it to accommodate individual prefer-
ences ex post. Whether corporate law has gone too far-or not far enough-
in deferring to private ordering is ultimately an empirical question. Time will
tell. Yet the debate over corporate religious rights and the elimination of
fiduciary duties confirms an important, unifying view in the field: that effi-
ciency is the primary lens through which such questions should be ad-
dressed, and that the primary role of corporate law is to ensure the efficient
conduct of economic activity, whether through regulation or private
ordering.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. MANDATORY AND STICKY-DEFAULT TERMS SUPPLIED BY
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW.2 18
Mandatory * Directors and officers subject to duty of loyalty, the duty
terms to act in good faith, the duty not to engage in intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; [§ 102(b)(7)]
* Directors may not declare dividends in excess of mini-
mum required capital [§ 173]
* Directors personally liable for impermissible dividends
[§ 174]
* Stockholders have (non-exclusive) right to amend by-
laws [§ 109(a)]
* Stockholders have the power to remove directors
[§ 141(k)]
* Directors must be natural persons [§ 141(b)]
* Directors elected by the stockholders [§ 216(3)]
* Corporation must reimburse directors, officers, employ-
ees, and agents of the corporation for legal proceedings if
the person acted in good faith and without reasonable
cause to believe that conduct was unlawful [§ 145(c)]
* Directors permitted to issue additional shares up to the
amount authorized in the certificate of incorporation
[§ 161]
* Corporation must hold annual meeting of stockholders
[§ 203(b)]
"Sticky" * Board of directors has exclusive authority to manage the
default corporation [§ 141(a)]
terms * Shareholders not personally liable for liabilities of the
corporation [§ 282(c)]
* One share, one vote [§ 212(a)]
* Perpetual existence [§ 102(b)(5)]
* Board acts by majority vote [§ 141(b)]
* Distributions to shareholders within the same class on a
pro rata basis [§ 15 1(a)]
* Board of directors has exclusive authority and discretion
to declare dividends [§ 170]
* Remaining directors have sole authority to fill vacancies
on the board [§ 223]
218 All section references in the table are to the corresponding sections of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8.
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